Pity, Hate, Resentment, and the Left by Stephens, Murdoch
This intervention argues that our understanding of negative emotions is underdeveloped due to 
the urge to expel negativity from the personal and 
political spheres. By invoking the antagonism of 
Chantal Mouffe’s philosophy, the article provides a 
conceptual grounding of pity, hate, and resentment 
by explaining these emotions based on whether the 
person feeling them sees the other as inferior, equal, or 
superior. For the Left, the intervention argues, a better 
understanding of these emotions will help people think 
through their own antagonisms, to counter accusations 
that all Left opposition is mere resentment, and to 
promote solidarity. Finally, the article seeks to hold 
open a space for a hatred that is neither pathologised 
nor eradicated. 
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The triumverate of pity, hate, and resentment are poorly 
understood and yet regularly invoked as both personal and 
political logics.1 An accusation of pity, hate, or resentment 
functions as an ad hominem—‘oh, he’s just a hater’—or as 
a crude simplification —‘the Left is driven by a politics of 
resentment’. The aim of this intervention is to reflect on 
these kinds of accusations after the fact, once the heat of it 
has passed. I want to reflect on these accusations by delving 
into each of the three antagonisms, suggesting how they 
relate both to one another and to a general negativity. The 
intervention becomes redemptive, not of the Left, but of the 
validity of the emotional experience of the three concepts. In 
particular, I want to offer a schema for people to recognise 
pity and resentment so that they can level those feelings into 
an egalitarian, though still negative, hate.2 
Pity, hate, resentment: everyday words with meanings 
rarely debated. The lack of understanding of these words 
extends from the personal sphere (‘I pity you’; ‘you hate me’) 
through to the political sphere (‘we hate them’; ‘they resent 
1  I would like to acknowledge Jack Foster and Dylan Taylor 
who I owe affection to (see Table 1) for their careful reading of an 
earlier version of this intervention as well as their stewardship of 
Counterfutures. 
2  It would be remiss to end this first paragraph without at least 
alluding to Nietzsche, who I (briefly) turn to in the coming pages.
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us’). Each refers to a negative emotional state directed at another person 
or group. But where the words differ is in how the individual values, or 
does not value, the person subjected to their antipathy. Resentment is 
when we dislike someone who we see as superior to ourselves. Pity is when 
we dislike someone who we see as inferior to ourselves. But when we see 
ourselves as equal to the person we dislike then that negative sentiment 
takes the form of hate.
Type of feeling
Positive Moderate Negative
Relation of 
other to the 
self
Better than I Admiration Respect Resentment
Equal to I Affection Esteem Hate
Worse than I Acceptance Tolerance Pity
Table 1. Emotional relations to valuing another.3
Looking into the personal feelings of pity, hate, and resentment are 
undoubtedly of use as we try to understand some of our negative reactions 
to others—whether they be comrades or cousins. But for this Counterfutures 
intervention, as with my article ‘Pākehā as Punisher’ in issue four, my aim 
is to take a relation that we understand from the intimate sphere and 
3  I hesitated to form the three-part distinction between pity, hate, and resentment 
into a matrix that also gave names to emotions that represented moderate and positive 
attitudes. That hesitation came through in my naming of the emotions that would 
fall in each box. I’m no structuralist. I don’t think that the words I’ve put into boxes 
should have lines between them. The matrix is intended only as an exploratory foray 
into a terrain that I hope others will also wish to survey so that the subject matter 
might receive further analysis, description, and use. In approximating this topology, 
we are able to contrast a positive schema against the negative. We can also discern a 
middle-ground, where the passions dip into the kind of neutrality that some might 
think make for civil politics.
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transpose it to the political sphere.4 In this case, this movement involves 
using examples of the three negative feelings in the personal sphere to help 
political agents understand their relationship to political adversaries.
Political antagonisms and emotions
The work of Chantal Mouffe offers one way to understand the recent 
history of political antagonism.5 Mouffe’s principle task is to foreground 
antagonism and dissent against Habermas and Rawls’s focus on striving for 
agreement and consensus. Mouffe’s work takes form through ‘agonism’—a 
type of antagonism that recognises the rights of all parties to exist and to 
participate in debate as legitimate actors. An example of agonism can be 
found in the competition of sport: we might hate the opposition with a 
curious fury, but we accept—and even promote—their right to play the 
game. In contrast, a blunt antagonism would occur if a sporting event 
spilled off the field of play into a violence unsanctioned by rules.
Mouffe critiques Habermas’s consensus politics for delimiting 
participation in political decisions to rational actors. Rationalism was 
required for these consensus systems because it supposedly paved the way 
for a politics that could go beyond the single-minded self-interest described 
by Schmidt. In contrast, any actor who was irrational could be excluded 
from decision-making because they would not be able to follow the process 
of recognising the other and working towards a common understanding 
in the public sphere. Mouffe is right to be suspicious of the way that the 
demand for rationalism would manifest as a tool of exclusion. For example, 
one aim in defining some political groups as terrorist organisations is to 
undermine their legitimacy to participate in political negotiations. Consider 
the fraught balance of the Taliban, for example, on the edge of negotiations 
4  Murdoch Stephens, ‘Pākehā as Punisher—Dominated Conversations on 
Dominant Cultures,’ Counterfutures no. 4 (2017): 185–191.
5  See Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000) and 
Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically (London: Verso, 2013).
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with the Afghan government and the United States-led forces.6 
But Mouffe is not just the antithesis of Habermas and Rawls: her 
work marks a circling back to, and a synthesis beyond, the all-against-
all antagonisms of earlier thinkers like Schmitt. Antagonism becomes 
agonism when the various interests that split groups are no longer seen as 
insurmountable or desirable. In short, Mouffe’s agonism is pluralist where 
Schmitt’s antagonism is not.
Across these discussions of how to embark on political communication 
and who is included, little attention is paid to the emotional tone of 
political expression. While the excluded irrational behaviour must give 
some indication that it cannot be trusted, there is no discussion of the 
emotions of agreement and agonism. Why might animating emotions 
be elided when theorists consider antagonisms in the political sphere? 
Perhaps studying the emotions of antagonism unnecessarily complicates 
things when there are other arguments that one is seeking to make. For 
us to understand enduring disagreement, I think we need to turn to some 
examples where emotional responses—such as pity—congeal or fester. 
Pity
My strongest memory of pity is from my first year at the University of Otago. It 
was lunchtime and I was walking from the university to my dorm. My memories 
are a little hazy, but I sense that it was a still, overcast day. It was not so cloudy 
that the hills hemmed in the cloud, but just enough to feel like the murky grey of 
the sky was a mirror of the ocean. These days are a common occurence in Otago, 
but rarer in the plains of Canterbury and almost impossible in Auckland and 
Wellington. I walked along Queen Street. It was a minor road, terraced into the 
hill and almost the complete opposite in all imaginable manner from the long 
6  I would argue that Mouffe is only able to be more open to actors who are 
considered outside the bound of rationalisms. The impetus of all of the models of 
consent and antagonism are on moving towards dialogue and agreement and at some 
point all of these scholars come up against the hypothetical example of a negotiant 
who is at the limit of our ability to make sense of them.
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one that runs through Central Auckland.
From a distance I saw a woman, doubled over in the driver’s seat of 
her car. Whenever she righted herself, her eyes darted about the street before 
ducking her head down as if attempting to hide from some unknown spy. As I 
drew up alongside the car I matched her furtive gestures with a crime: she was 
demolishing a bucket of KFC. Having come from a small farming town, KFC 
was always something I associated with the city. But even so, I’d never seen a 
real bucket before—all those battered limbs of chicken piled up and coated with 
those herbs and spices. I knew nothing of the woman but sensed a shameful 
transgression. I walked on without pausing. And I pitied her.
If we want to have a richer conception of the legitimacy of antagonism 
it is useful to turn to the murkier question of how we value others. If we 
consider pity and resentment we find a relation between the self and other 
that is not that of equals. If we are not equals, then the relationship of the 
worthy adversary that is so central to Mouffe’s agonism becomes difficult, 
perhaps impossible.
Consider the personal case made above: I pitied the woman eating 
KFC alone in her car. Why? I’ve thought about this many times. I wasn’t 
a vegetarian at the time, so it wasn’t that. Could it be the racial or class 
signifiers of fried chicken? Perhaps that had something to do with it. Would 
I be as equally pitying if the woman had been tucking into a panini? But 
on reflection, the crux of the experience was the furtive glance. That glance 
revealed a face distorted with shame, pleasure, and fear. I feel that my pity 
was justified, even though I sympathise with her situation. But I could have 
read it all wrong. Maybe she was listening to the radio and her expression 
was not the result of everything that I have projected onto her but rather a 
winsomely left response to her lunchtime pleasure being sullied by 
Leighton Smith.7
7  Leighton Smith is an Australian-born talk-back radio host who was grating 
liberals and leftists alike from a time before Sean Plunket’s or Mike Hosking’s voices 
had broken. The author maintains a particular animosity to Smith due to one of the 
presenter’s sneering diatribes about the author’s ultimately successful ‘Doing Our Bit’ 
campaign to double New Zealand’s refugee quota.
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A politics motivated by pity is undesirable for the Left for two reasons. 
First, if pity is extended from the personal to the political then it is also 
expanded across a massive scale. While the pity shown in the example 
above can be thought through—e.g. maybe she wasn’t really ashamed of the 
fried chicken—extending this example to pity an entire category of people 
means that it becomes a categorical truth. In this case, that truth places 
the Left in a position of superiority to the average person that we seek to 
work alongside. As one reviewer of this intervention noted, in pitying we 
see the target of our actions as worse than us, which is problematic as it 
creates an idealised other (the poor and downcast, who we pity and wish 
to raise above their low station). This idealised other dehumanises those 
we imagine ourselves aligning with. By contrast, the reviewer noted, the 
philanthropy of the Right is well-suited to this position, as it allows them 
to bolster their own sense of superiority and the ‘natural order’ of which 
they are at the pinnacle.
The second shortcoming of pity as a political strategy applies to the 
adversary rather than a broad public. Pity works to deflate any threat our 
adversaries might pose. For example, the alt-right incel figure is dismissed 
as a serious political force because of their pitiable attempt to find a positive 
identity on the basis of their rejection by women. These dismissals are most 
troublesome when they stand-in for taking action against such a figure. 
Viewing the other as inferior undermines the broad democratic base 
of the Left. A challenge for middle-class leftists in forging an alliance with 
the working class are socio-cultural differences that are, frankly, barely 
important. But it is these socio-cultural factors—things like white bread 
or preferred brand of beer—that make up a lot of attempts by people 
to show their worth. While conspicuous displays of worth can involve 
creativity or imagination, more often than not they are simply raw displays 
of wealth. Pitying someone who either can not, or refuses to, participate in 
these fashions is a distraction from the abilities of people to forge political 
alliances. Those political alliances often require traversing real differences 
in race, gender, and class for which consumption choices can stand in as a 
proxy. Pitying these choices—even when there are justifiable reasons to do 
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so in terms of quality—is just one more way that solidarity crumbles into 
inane division.
Before turning to a relational and emotional stance to the adversary 
that could be more useful, I need to consider an inverse to pity: resentment. 
Not all situations of pity would also involve resentment, but where pity sees 
the other as worse than us, resentment flips this position: the other is seen 
as better than us.
Resentment
I resent my ex. An ex. She has moved on: marriage, mortgage, children, career. 
I have not, or I have not moved on so much as I have siddled off on my own, 
sullen way. I recognise my negative feelings towards her and recognise that they 
come from the difficult place of thinking that she is better than me.
What about resentment? Admissions of resentment are rare and curious. 
It is hard to boast that one is resentful because it is also a statement of 
inferiority. Most of the everyday admissions I have heard come with an 
implication that the inferiority is partial, and may soon be resolved: I resent 
my friend’s good fortune; I resent waiting in a queue.
In my example, the reader should wonder about the truthfulness of my 
resentment. Do I truly see my ex as better than me if I can see the situation 
so clearly? Perhaps there is a catch-22 at play: anyone able to admit their 
resentment isn’t really inferior as their admission requires the strength to 
abandon the tools we use to protect ourselves from feeling inferior. But 
we can also imagine my admission as a ruse: I say that I recognise my 
resentment so as to project my reasonableness and clear-thinking. I say that 
I am resentful to create the conditions for no longer being resentful. Speech 
has such a power!
Many books have been written on how to extricate oneself from the 
psychological overinvestment in another, or cathexis. While I won’t go into 
the work required to redeem one’s self and, in turn, our view of those who 
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we resent, I do want to gesture to Kierkegaard’s Either/Or.8 In that work, 
cocooned away from his own cursed romance by a series of pseudonyms 
and literary methods, he turns the tables on resentment to describe the 
best way for a resented lover to cool the jilted. The long and short of 
Keirkegaard’s advice is to balance the relationship away from resentment 
through a display of affection for a new, pitiable partner. This display, he 
argues, will lead to a re-evaluation of the object of affection. The lesson, 
as in the approximations in the matrix in Figure 1, is that we can change 
our value of another by changing how we value them or how they value us 
(better, equal, or worse than us), or how we see the relationship to them 
(positive, neutral, or negative).
The popularity of resentment as an accusation against the Left 
comes from right-wing uses of Nietzschean theories on Christianity and 
slave morality.9 From Nietzsche’s view, the Christian faith grows from a 
resentment against the powerful. As the number of Christians grew they 
were able to extend their morality into a system of laws that subjugated 
the powerful and conquered their consciousness with an ethic that denies 
power and mutes human will.
The Nietzschean critique is transposed by the contemporary Right 
from the metaphysical space of a critique of good and evil (and valorisation 
of the will to power) to the economic space of a critique of inequality and 
exploitation. While the case could be made that today’s economic critiques 
are merely an inherited subsystem of previous subsystems, the point feels 
opportunist. If economic critiques are always a function of resentment 
despite the material basis of the critiques, one wonders at what point the 
incisiveness of Nietzsche’s metaphysical critique is overdone.
The concept of resentment is used by the Right in a curious bit of 
circular accounting that explains away almost all antagonistic political 
relations. The reasoning of the Right goes like this: the poor are lefties 
8  Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or: A Fragment of Life (London: Penguin Classics, 1992).
9  Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). My reading of resentment was informed by the work of 
Kathleen Higgins and Robert Soloman, most notably: What Nietzsche Really Said 
(New York: Schocken, 2001).
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because they envy the wealthy. If they were no longer poor, they would no 
longer be left-wing. The Left, to the Right, is institutionalised resentment. 
The Right assumes that the poor (and Left, by proxy) see their economic 
conditions as the entire basis of their being. In this worldview, all critiques 
of capitalism (and the resulting inequities) are grounded not in any actual 
economics or politics but in the psychological shortcomings inherent to 
poverty.10 Poverty, to the Right, determines the worldview of the poor and 
the Left and neccesarily leads them to the logical recognition of their own 
inferiority. It should be easy to reject this view by claiming that there are 
more important things in the world than money, but this reductive logic 
seems as doggedly enduring as capitalism itself.
The value of a critique of both pity and resentment for the Left should 
now be obvious: it offers a riposte to the Right’s attempt to ground leftist 
politics in infantile jealousies and buffers the Left against the inward turn 
to moral superiority. But if we reject the idea that the Left is animated by 
resentment, and if pity is not a viable strategy for distancing ourselves from 
those we oppose, does that mean we need to simply drop the negativity 
and find some common ground? Maybe the Left could lighten up on the 
capital-C Critique of capital-C Capitalism a bit, but I would argue that 
there must still be a place for antagonism. The antagonism that I would 
make space for is called hate, an emotionality that treats adversaries as 
equals even if we don’t see eye-to-eye.11
Hate
I hate my landlord. Our rent has just been increased by 10 percent and yet 
they leave the downstairs flat empty while they decide whether to renovate it 
or not. If money were the problem then you’d think they would have timed 
10  One can imagine that the same would have applied to feudalism: ‘The serfs are 
merely jealous that they are not ordained with royal blood as decreed by God’.
11  I’m thinking, here, of invoking J.K. Gibson-Graham, The End of Capitalism 
(as We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996) or perhaps just a bit more critique that is grounded in a reading of capital-C 
Colonisation.
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the renovations with kicking the previous tenants out. We ask them, via the 
property management company, to fix the front door and if we can have a cat. 
The first question is ignored, the second is rejected. I’ve never met them, but I 
hate both them and the property manager.
The Soviet poet Vladimir Mayakovsky released a set of poems with the rare 
distinction of being legible in both the Cyrillic of Russian and the Latin 
script of English: HATE!12 Those four letters, if read in English, speak of 
the intense emotion of an aggressive antipathy. Hate is so foundational that 
it barely needs explanation. In Mayakovsky’s Russian, HATE! means ‘here 
you are!’ His assertion explodes: ‘I’ve found you! I’ve found the real you! 
The lost but essential, you! You are hate. And you were obscured . . . but 
now you are found!’ For Mayakovsky, an emblematic but troubled figure 
for Bolshevik poetry, this rich word play was his contribution to a social 
struggle that eventually had no use for his passions. Here you are!
The most useful emotional relation to a political adversary is hatred. 
In the manner recognised by Mouffe, we recognise them as equals with a 
right to exist in the political space, but nevertheless we deeply oppose them, 
their practices, and/or their beliefs. Hatred is valid and can be effective if 
its intensities are channeled into political action. By describing the need to 
channel the intensities of hatred into political action I am not suggesting 
that hatred becomes tampered down into a more reasonable, friction-less 
discourse. Nor am I suggesting that there is something singular about 
hatred that other emotional states do not possess—love could be equally 
balanced and useful and has been the subject of many personal and political 
enquiries. Hate, in contrast to love, is at something of a loose end. There 
is an instructive anecodote at the beginning of Semiotext(e)’s Hatred of 
Capitalism where Sylvere Lotringer (S) is chatting to Chris Kraus (C):
S: What happened is that we forgot that capitalism even exists. It has become 
invisible because there’s nothing else to see. When I told Baudrillard about 
12  Vladamir Mayakovsky, HATE! (Kharkov: Folio, 2009).
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this book, he said the title sounded too old-fashioned.
C: He didn’t get the joke.13
Lotringer and Kraus’s view of hatred is two-fold: first as a throw-back, then 
as a laugh. Hatred, at that odd point in time—a decade after the end of 
the Cold War but before the new American quagmires—was something 
either best left to the cavemen or that could be joked about knowingly. The 
first verso of the collection explains where the title actually came from: a 
response from film-maker Jack Smith to the journal name Semiotext(e).
Listen: Hatred of Capitalism would be a much better title. It’s stunning. 
The world is starving for thoughts. If you can think of something, the 
language will fall into place, but the thought is what’s going to do it.14
For this intervention, Smith and Mayakovsky are patron saints. They 
express hate as an emotion of vigorous, creative opposition.15 A similarly 
vibrant approach to the animating powers of hatred come through in 
Sloterdijk’s Rage and Time.16 Rage and Time repositions hatred through 
the concept of thymos. Thymos is the Ancient Greek term for a rage that 
one directs, rather than for a rage that takes over the body. As Couture 
summarises, thymos is the controlled, directed, and domesticated form of 
rage.17 Thymos is a form of rage that is both powerful and strategic. Hate 
need not be an irrational force prohibited from political struggle, but as 
13  Chris Kraus and Sylvere Lotringer, ‘Introduction: The History of Semiotext(e),’ 
in Hatred of Capitalism, eds. Sylvere Lotringer and Chris Kraus (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2002), 15–16.
14  Jack Smith, Epigram in Hatred of Capitalism, 4.
15  I would argue that hatred is a gendered performance, with descriptions like these 
more likely to be levelled at men who display hate rather than women. This is not to 
say that women don’t hate, but that the way their hatred is received has less room for 
being seen as vigorous or creative.
16  Peter Sloterdijk, Rage and Time: A Psycho-Political Investigation (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2012).
17  Jean-Pierre Couture, Sloterdijk (London: Polity Press, 2015).
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thymos can be deployed through a rhetorical rage. Rhetoric, in Sloterdijk’s 
overview of the field, ‘is the doctrine of controlling affects in political 
ensembles, is applied thymotics’.18
Hate could be an antagonism that is not changed by being recognised—
unlike resentment—as while the relation to the situation is negative, the 
relation to the other is one of equals. Schopenahuer uses the porcupine as 
a naturalised figure of antagonism that permeates a pessimistic society. As 
he tells it, the porcupine in winter is like the human in society. In winter 
the cold pushes the porcupine into close proximity with others in search of 
warmth. But as they get closer their quills intrude on one another and so 
the little mammals endure the sharpness of their collective company and 
are only rewarded with the most minimal of body heat.19 The story has an 
appeal to the misanthrope, but achieved wider fame when it was recalled by 
Freud—hence, a healthy recrudescene for the concept in books like those 
of Luepnitz and Warwick.20 
But before Freud, Nietzsche had made reference of the porcupine as a 
mark of his late turn away from Schopenhauer and nihilism. In reflecting 
on his place in German towns he wrote:
In such circumstances should I not be compelled to become a hedgehog? 
But to have prickles amounts to a squandering of strength; they even 
constitute a twofold luxury, when, if we only chose to do so, we could 
dispense with them and open our hands instead.21 
As with Nietzche’s late turn to joy, our matrix is not just a tool to elaborate 
18  Sloterdijk, Rage and Time, 15. Ironically, across a series of public-facing 
commentary in newspapers, Sloterdijk seems almost pathologically unable to recognise 
the sorts of economic exploitation that animate Left thought and practice. 
19  Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms (New York: Penguin, 2004).
20  Deborah Luepnitz, Schopenhauer’s Porcupines: Intimacy and its Dilemmas: Five 
Stories of Psychotherapy (New York: Basic Books, 2013); Hugh Warwick, The Hedgehog’s 
Dilemma: A Tale of Obsession, Nostalgia, and the World’s Most Charming Mammal 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2004).
21  Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is (New York: 
Algora Publishing, 2004), 32.
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on negative thoughts. There are other important emotions not discussed in 
this intervention: affection, admiration, acceptance, and even those from the 
ambivalent, or moderate sphere. Consider, for example, Papastergiadis, who 
aligns the ontologies implicit in Sloterdijk and Mouffe around antagonism 
and agonism, then challenges the reader to think of an alternative to this 
opposition as a grounding politics.22 And while that evocation of a politics 
beyond conflict—think co-operation or mutual aid—is not the writ of 
this paper, it could be a kind of compulsory detoxification required of any 
intervention that fixates a little too much on the negative.
To find hope in hate as an equaliser between resentment and pity 
might not be the end goal of most psycho-political investigations. But is 
the opposite—opening our hands or turns to joy—as infallible as works 
on love and peace might propose? Just as I have argued that the negative 
stance of hate can obscure an egalitarianism, so too can the positive rhetoric 
of love be used to disguise all sorts of contempt and corruption. Love thy 
neighbour? Well . . . maybe . . . but what of the landlord? As wages stagnate 
and rents leap ahead of our ability to pay, our hatred of the landlord—
expunged of resentment, and without a cloying self-pity—may be the best 
response.
22  Nikos Papastergiadis, ‘Does Philosophy Contribute to an Invasion Complex? 
Sloterdijk the Antagonist and the Agonism of Mouffe,’ Journal of Aesthetics & Culture 
9, no. 2 (2017): 13–24.
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